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ABSTRACT 
We identify three channels and the corresponding mechanisms through which corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) may affect corporate cash holdings.  CSR firms are expected to 
have relatively low cash holdings because they tend to have low idiosyncratic risk due to 
their higher social capital with stakeholders. CSR firms also tend to have low systematic risk 
due to greater loyalty from CSR investors and/or customers.  Lower systematic risk may 
increase or decrease cash holdings. Although low systematic risk induces firms to reduce 
their cash holdings, it also induces firms to hold a short debt maturity structure, with higher 
refinancing risks that higher cash holdings may mitigate. The agency view of CSR argues 
that entrenched managers in a firm with strong corporate governance may use CSR activities 
to collude with stakeholders in order to get higher managerial discretion (including cash) to 
extract private benefits. However, the corporate governance role of CSR implies that CSR is 
also effective in reducing the agency problems associated with the cash holdings decision. 
Using 2,364 firms with 14,206 firm-year observations over the period 1991–2011, we 
establish that the positive effect of CSR on cash holdings via the systematic risk channel is 
robust, while the effects of CSR via the other two channels are not. Our findings are robust to 
different estimation methods and alternative measures of cash holdings, CSR, risks and 
corporate governance.  
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We identify three channels and the corresponding mechanisms through which corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) may affect corporate cash holdings.  CSR firms are expected to 
have relatively low cash holdings because they tend to have low idiosyncratic risk due to 
their higher social capital with stakeholders. CSR firms also tend to have low systematic risk 
due to greater loyalty from CSR investors and/or customers.  Lower systematic risk may 
increase or decrease cash holdings. Although low systematic risk induces firms to reduce 
their cash holdings, it also induces firms to hold a short debt maturity structure, with higher 
refinancing risks that higher cash holdings may mitigate. The agency view of CSR argues 
that entrenched managers in a firm with strong corporate governance may use CSR activities 
to collude with stakeholders in order to get higher managerial discretion (including cash) to 
extract private benefits. However, the corporate governance role of CSR implies that CSR is 
also effective in reducing the agency problems associated with the cash holdings decision. 
Using 2,364 firms with 14,206 firm-year observations over the period 1991–2011, we 
establish that the positive effect of CSR on cash holdings via the systematic risk channel is 
robust, while the effects of CSR via the other two channels are not. Our findings are robust to 
different estimation methods and alternative measures of cash holdings, CSR, risks and 
corporate governance.  
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While the determinants of corporate cash holdings have been widely studied in the 
literature, the direct relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate 
cash holdings remains largely unexplored. We fill this gap by examining whether and how 
CSR relates to corporate cash holdings. In particular, we identify and test three channels 
through which CSR may explain cash holdings. They are the idiosyncratic risk channel, the 
systematic risk channel, and the corporate governance channel. CSR firms have higher social 
capital because they tend to have better relationships with stakeholders, providing insurance-
like protection that can mitigate harm from negative (especially firm-specific) events, thus 
reducing the need to maintain cash holdings at a high level. Inelastic demand due to either 
consumers’ loyalty to CSR firms or investors’ preference for CSR firms leads to lower 
systematic risk, which in turn makes CSR firms less sensitive to aggregate shocks. This has 
two competing effects on cash holdings. On the one hand, low sensitivity to aggregate shocks 
makes firms less inclined to build up a large cash holding. On the other hand, firms with 
lower systematic risk tend to have a shorter debt maturity structure and thus a higher 
refinancing risk, suggesting that a higher cash holding is required to mitigate the refinancing 
risk.  The corporate governance channel may strengthen or weaken the association between 
CSR and cash holding. First, the corporate government role of CSR implies that CSR is also 
effective in reducing the agency problems associated with the cash holdings decision; the 
stronger the corporate governance is, the lower the level of cash holdings will be. However, 
the agency view of CSR argues that entrenched managers in a firm with strong corporate 
governance may use CSR activities to collude with stakeholders in order to get higher 
















Using corporate social responsibility measures from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini 
(KLD) of 2,364 firms between 1991 and 2011, we examine the significance and compare the 
relative importance of these three channels, and find that not all of them are useful in 
channeling the influence of CSR on cash holdings. Among the three channels through which 
CSR might affect corporate cash holdings, only the systematic risk channel is a robust; the 
other channels are not.  
Arouri and Pijourlet (2015) (hereafter called A&P (2015)) is closely related to our paper. 
They examine the impact of CSR on the value of cash holdings. In other words, they look at 
the cash holdings problem from investor's perspective, i.e., how investors expect cash to be 
used. Using 2,217 firm-year observations1 of 50 countries over the period 2005 to 2009, they 
find evidence that investors assign a higher value to cash held by firms that have a high CSR 
performance. More specifically, in a regression specifying the market value of the firm (i.e., 
equity and debt) as the dependent variable, with CSR, cash holdings and their interaction 
term as independent variables, they report a statistically significant and positive coefficient 
for cash holdings and its interaction term with CSR, but an insignificant and negative 
coefficient for CSR. In other words, the value of cash holdings is conditional on CSR 
performance.2 They interpret this result as being consistent with the conflict-resolution view 
of CSR, i.e., that firms with a high CSR rating allow managers to gain greater stakeholder 
commitment, leading to a more efficient use of financial resources (including cash, 
presumably). Our paper is different from theirs in the following ways. First, instead of taking 
an (indirect) investor's perspective, we look at the cash holdings problem directly from a 
corporate perspective. The A&P (2015)’s approach is capital market based and relies on some 
                                                             
1
 Their nominal sample size is 4,161 firm-year observations (or 1113 firms). A closer look at their results reveals 
that the effective sample size is just 2,217 firm-year observations and they base most of their key findings on 
these. 
2
 With obvious notations, the regression may be written as mv = a0 + a1*cash + a2*csr + a3*(cash*csr) + ….  
The value of cash is captured by (mv)/(cash) = a1 + a3*csr, where according to Table 4 of A&P (2015) a1 and 
a3 are positive (i.e., 1.750 and 0.504, respectively). In other words, the value of cash is conditional on and 
















strong assumptions (such as stock market efficiency, rationality of and homogeneity in 
investor behavior, etc.) that may not be shared by all financial economists. For example, the 
well-known agency cost of debt problem (i.e., conflict of interests between shareholder and 
bondholders) predicts that shareholders tend to maximize their own interest at the expense of 
bondholders' interest. When it comes to corporate cash holdings, this agency view predicts 
that bondholders tend to favor more while shareholders tend to prefer less. In the presence of 
this kind of conflict of interest, it is not clear whether it is the shareholders, the bondholders 
or both who are happy to assign a high value to cash holdings. Second, A&P (2015)'s 
interpretation of the above regression results ignores an important piece of evidence reported 
in Table 3 of their paper. In particular, Table 3 shows that the correlation between cash and 
csr is -0.04 (negative and statistically significant). By incorporating the negative relationship 
between cash and csr into the value of cash, one can easily show that the value of cash 
actually depends on the level of cash in a negative way; the higher the cash level, the lower 
will be the value of cash. In addition, this observation undermines the key findings of A&P 
(2015) because the value of cash can be negative in some plausible situations.3  Our direct 
approach is free of these contentious assumptions and interpretation problems. Third, A&P 
(2015) do not identify specific channels through which CSR affects cash holdings explicitly, 
but we do. We also examine the relative importance of these channels. Fourth, possibly due to 
data limitations, A&P (2015) do not control for corporate governance in their analysis, which 
may impair their main findings because of omitted variable bias. Corporate governance, if not 
properly controlled for, is known to be related to agency costs and cash holdings negatively, 
because it helps to alleviate agency problems associated with cash holdings (see, e.g., Dittmar 
                                                             
3
 Consistent with the evidence that cash and csr are negatively correlated, assume that csr = b1*cash where b1 < 
0. Substituting this equation for csr in the conditional effect, we get (mv)/(cash) = a1 + a3*csr = a1 + 
a3*b1*cash. As Table 4 of A&P (2015) reports that a1 and a3 are positive (i.e., 1.750 and 0.504, respectively), 
this implies that a3*b1 < 0.  This also suggests that (mv)/(cash) can be negative if b1*cash takes any value less 
















and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Yun, 2009; Chen et al., 2012). We control for corporate governance 
explicitly in this paper. 
Our study contributes to the cash holding literature and the CSR literature in three 
different ways. First, we propose, and find direct evidence consistent with, CSR as a 
determinant of cash holdings that is new to the cash holdings literature; this complements the 
indirect evidence of A&P (2015). Second, by integrating two separate strands of literature on 
finance and CSR, we identify and examine three channels through which CSR may affect 
cash holdings. Third, our study clarifies the relative effectiveness of the various channels 
through which CSR affects corporate cash holdings. We find evidence supporting the 
systematic risk channel as a major channel through which CSR can positively affect cash 
holdings.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the relevant hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our key variables and 
data set. Section 4 presents our methodology, and Section 5 reports the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 6 sets forth our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The last decade has witnessed a significant increase in academic research devoted to the 
exploration of possible links between corporate social responsibility and key finance 
decisions or parameters. Recent studies include investment or future cash flows (Manescu 
and Starica, 2010), systematic risk (Albuquerque et al., 2014), the cost of debt/bank loans 
(Menz, 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011), the cost of equity (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Ghoul et al., 
2011), the cost of capital (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008), mergers and 
acquisitions (Deng et al., 2013), and dividend policy (Rakotomavo, 2012; Cheung, Hu and 
















indirect relationship between CSR and corporate cash holdings from a market valuation 
perspective, the direct relationship between CSR and corporate cash holdings remains 
unexplored. 
The literature has spawned numerous hypotheses about the determinants of cash holdings. 
The extant literature indicates that firms hold cash for transaction purposes (Baumol, 1952; 
Meltzer, 1963; Miller and Orr, 1966). The recent literature also establishes that other motives 
matter too. They include the precautionary motive (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009), the 
agency cost motive (Jensen, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008), the financial constraint motive 
(Almeida et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010), the tax motive (Foley 
et al., 2007), and the diversification motive (Duchin, 2010; Tong, 2011). Other economic 
determinants include product market competition (Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007; 
Fresard, 2010), the firm life cycle (Dittmar and Duchin, 2011), and the customer relationship 
(Itzkowitz, 2013). 
By integrating two different lines of literature together, we argue that CSR affects 
corporate cash holdings via the following three channels. 
 
2.1 The idiosyncratic risk channel   
Some scholars argue that CSR may be viewed as a way in which firms accumulate social 
(or moral) capital over time (Godfrey, 2005; Peloza, 2006; Aoki, 2007; Russo and Perrini, 
2010; Antoni and Sacconi, 2011).4 It works because, by participating in CSR-related 
activities, firms strengthen and/or maintain a good relationship between (external and 
                                                             
4 The World Bank defines social capital as the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of a society’s social interactions. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAP
ITAL/0,,contentMDK:20185164~menuPK:418217~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html 
















internal) stakeholders in the form of credibility among customers and investors, trust among 
employees and suppliers, and a strong social image among communities and regulators.5   
Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) argue further that CSR lowers idiosyncratic risk, because 
firms with a higher level of social capital are expected to have a greater ability to absorb 
(external and internal) shocks. In particular, a good relationship with stakeholders provides 
these firms with insurance-like protection that stabilizes the demand and supply in times of 
crisis and increases resilience against shocks, contributing to accelerating their recovery and 
sustainable growth.  
Idiosyncratic risk is connected to cash holdings positively because the precautionary 
motive for cash holdings is increased for firms whenever their cash flows become riskier 
(Bates et al., 2009). Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Firms with high CSR scores tend to have low idiosyncratic risk and 
 small cash holdings. 
   
2.2 The systematic risk channel 
Investors’ taste for CSR firms and/or customer loyalty to CSR firms can lower systematic 
risk. Investors with a taste for CSR firms no longer view investment in CSR firms as 
investment assets, but as consumption assets, because they can derive utility from holding 
these assets rather than from their pay-offs (Fama and French, 2007). This investment 
behavior imputes some kind of inelasticity to the demand curve for CSR stocks. For example, 
investors may buy or sell these stocks, not because of their risk-adjusted return performance 
or economic fundamentals, but because of their CSR performance. Similarly, greater 
customer loyalty to CSR firms means that these firms will face a more loyal (i.e., less price-
                                                             
5
 This argument is in line with the conflict-resolution view of CSR put forward by A&P(2015). However, as this 
















sensitive) demand and have a profit function that is less sensitive to changes in economic 
fundamentals. This kind of inelasticity makes these stocks less responsive to market-wide 
shocks, and less prone to systematic risk. This channel therefore indicates that firms with 
higher CSR scores tend to have lower systematic risk (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; 
Albuquerque et al., 2014; Jo and Na, 2012). 
There are two competing views on the relationship between systematic risk and cash 
holdings. The first view is that a lower systematic risk may decrease cash holdings because it 
reduces the transaction motive for hoarding cash for various reasons (Palazzo, 2012; Acharya 
et al., 2013). Palazzo (2012) shows that firms with low correlation with aggregate shocks are 
less likely to experience a cash-flow shortfall in situations in which they need external 
financing most and, therefore, are expected to have fewer hedging needs and to hold less 
cash. Acharya et al. (2013) also argue that systematic risk can affect how firms choose 
between cash and bank credit lines. Because banks may not be able to guarantee liquidity for 
all firms at all times, they tend to grant credit lines to those firms with low systematic risk, so 
that not all firms will ask for funds at the same time. Briefly, this view argues that CSR firms 
tend to have less systematic risk, and this, in turn, reduces the need to hoard cash, leading to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: Firms with high CSR scores tend to have low systematic risk and, thus, small      
         cash holdings.  
 
The second view is that a lower systematic risk may lead to a higher level of cash 
holdings because of refinancing risk. Harford, Klasa and Maxwell (2014) argue that firms 
with a shorter debt maturity structure face refinancing risk more frequently. To mitigate the 
















reducing refinancing risk for firms with short-term debt. Chen, Xu and Yang (2013) show, in 
a dynamic capital structure model, that firms with higher systematic risk tend to choose a 
longer debt maturity structure, because a longer debt maturity helps reduce refinancing risk 
and, thus, lower the costs of financial distress. Taken together, firms with high (low) 
systematic risk are expected to have a longer (shorter) debt maturity and smaller (larger) 
refinancing risk with smaller (larger) cash holdings.  Thus, we set the following hypothesis: 
 
H2b: Firms with high CSR scores tend to have low systematic risk and, thus, large  
         cash holdings. 
 
2.3 The corporate governance channel 
On the one hand, CSR may be correlated with corporate governance negatively. The 
agency theory contends that both CSR activities and cash holdings are expected to be 
positively correlated because entrenched management tends to build up cash (Jensen, 1986) 
and engage in CSR activities, to pursue their own interests (Surroca and Tribo, 2008; Jiraporn 
and Chintrakarn, 2013; Fabrizi, Mallin, and Michelon, 2014; A&P, 2015). However, early 
studies of this line of research were plagued by the fact that agency cost is not directly 
observable, and that the moderating role of corporate governance, which may attenuate 
managerial entrenchment or other forms of agency costs, tended to be ignored or undermined. 
Recent studies typically support the role of corporate governance, and show that corporate 
governance is related to cash holdings negatively, because it helps alleviate agency problems 
associated with cash holdings (see, e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Yun, 2009; Chen et 
al., 2012). If entrenched managers are more likely to retain a free cash flow and/or pursue 
















lower for firms with good corporate governance. Based on this observation, we set the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3a: Firms with low CSR scores are associated with strong corporate      
governance and small cash holdings. 
 
On the other hand, CSR may be also related to corporate governance positively for the 
following reasons. First, it is interesting to note that a widely used framework, so-called 
“Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance” (ESG), which the international 
investment community uses to assess socially responsible investments, includes corporate 
governance as one of its building blocks. KLD adopts this framework in constructing its CSR 
measures. By construction, strong (weak) corporate governance leads to high (low) CSR, 
other things being equal. Second, Beltratti (2005) argues that CSR and corporate governance 
are positively related because they are complementary in their shaping of the objective 
function and the constraints faced by firms. Third, incumbent managers of firms with strong 
corporate governance may use relationships with stakeholder activists as an effective 
entrenchment strategy, suggesting that strong corporate governance is associated with high 
CSR (Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Surroca and Tribo, 2008; Fabrizi et al., 2014). The 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3b: Firms with high CSR scores are associated with strong corporate      
governance and small cash holdings.  
 
It is noteworthy that our hypotheses are new to the literature. The fact that the literature 
















affect corporate cash holdings does not necessarily imply that the above three hypotheses 
must hold.  It is possible that the impact of CSR upon cash holdings via a particular channel 
is so weak that its overall impact on cash holdings is not statistically significant.  
 
3. Key variables and data 
3.1 Measure of corporate social responsibility, risks, and corporate governance 
We use corporate social responsibility measures from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini 
(KLD) of 2,888 firms between 1991 and 2011. These KLD measure scores cover seven 
dimensions: community relations (com), corporate governance (cg), diversity (div), employee 
relations (emp), environment (env), human rights (hum), and product safety (pro). Each 
dimension is rated yearly based on a number of positive (strength) and negative (weakness) 
indicators. These indicators are dummy variables that are given a score of 1 if a particular 
strength (or weakness) is present and otherwise 0. The total number of indicators has varied 
from 54 in 1991 to the highest of 74 in 2007. The strengths and weaknesses for each ESG 
dimension are then aggregated to give an overall score for that dimension. Several popular 
aggregation methods are used in previous studies based on KLD data (e.g., Kempf and 
Osthoff, 2007; Chatterji et al., 2009). However, Manescu (2011) points out some potential 
limitations of these aggregation methods, including the lack of comparability across years 
and dimensions, due to the varying number of indicators over time, and the inflated KLD 
scores for industries that are not sensitive to certain ESG dimensions (such as the 
environment, community relations, human rights, and employee relations).   
Following Deng et al. (2013), we use the relative aggregation method, which is designed 
to minimize the potential drawbacks of the KLD data. The formula of the relative aggregation 

















    
   
          
   
 
   
  
  
          
   
 




where       is the CSR score for dimension i at time t;            is the p
th strength indicator 
for dimension i at time t;            is the qth strength indicator for dimension i at time t; 
both indicators are dummy variables that equal 1 if the firm meets strength p or weakness q, 
otherwise 0; and     and     are the total number of strength and weakness indicators, 
respectively, at time t.  As strength (weakness) indicators are first summed up and then 
averaged each year before the CSR score is computed, this procedure ensures that year-to-
year comparisons can be made meaningfully. Note that the CSR score so computed is easy to 
interpret as, by construction, it lies between -1 and +1. The aggregate CSR score is just a 
simple average of the CSR scores of the six dimensions with the corporate governance 
dimension excluded. The exclusion of the corporate governance dimension helps isolate the 
impact of this dimension when the impact of CSR on the corporate governance channel is 
estimated. 
To construct our measure of corporate governance, we take advantage of the fact that 
corporate governance is among the seven dimensions of the KLD measures.  Thus, we use 
this dimension to construct the corporate governance measure. In particular, using the relative 
aggregation method, we compute the corporate governance measure as follows: 
 
     
          
  
   
  
 
          
  




where     is the score for the corporate governance dimension at time t; other variables are 
similarly defined as in the CSR equation except that now dimension i is confined to the 
















Following the literature on idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2009; and Jo and Na, 2012), we use the market model to compute idiosyncratic 
risk and systematic risk. Using the daily stock returns of the previous twelve months, we run 
an OLS regression on stock returns with a stock market index6 and compute the regression 
coefficient on the stock market index. This coefficient is beta, and we use it as a measure of 
systematic risk. We also compute idiosyncratic risk as the root mean squared error of the 
regression.7  
 
3.2. Measure of corporate cash holdings and control variables 
Our measure of corporate cash holdings is the ratio of cash to assets. It has been 
employed extensively in the finance literature (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; 
Acharya et al., 2013; Palazzo, 2012).8 We also use a set of standard control variables that are 
known to be determinants of corporate cash holdings in the literature (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; 
Dittmar et al., 2003; Bates et al., 2009). They include firm size, book-to-market, leverage, 
capital expenditure, payouts, research and development expenditure, net working capital, 
cash flow, cash flow volatility, and retained earnings to total assets. A comprehensive list of 
variables, definitions, and sources is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
3.3. Data 
We obtain financial data from Compustat, and stock market data from CRSP. We begin 
with 1991 because KLD information on CSR is available from 1991. The sample is restricted 
                                                             
6 In particular, a value-weighted market index from CRSP called the “CRSP value-weighted index” (vwretd) is 
used.  
7 As shown in the robustness tests section, our main results are robust to an alternative measure of idiosyncratic 
risk and systematic risk derived from the Fama–French four-factor model. 
8
 We do not use excess cash as a measure of corporate cash holdings because it is sensitive to the model of 
"normal" or "expected" cash specified, and "it is not straight-forward to interpret a change in excess cash, since 
this may be caused by either a change in total cash or a change in some of the determinants of optimal cash" 
















to only those firms that have non-missing values for cash holdings, CSR and other key 
variables. Financial firms with SIC codes 6000–6999 and utility firms with SIC codes 4900–
4999 are excluded from the sample. To mitigate the effect of outliers, all the variables (except 
the CSR variables) are winsorized at their first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Our final sample 
consists of 2,364 firms with 14,206 firm-year observations. 
 
4. Methodology 
To test the research hypotheses, we specify the following empirical model: 
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             (3) 
                               
 
              (4) 
 
The model consists of four equations. Equation (1) describes how the idiosyncratic risk 
(idio) channel, the unsystematic risk (beta) channel, and the corporate governance (cg) 
channel determine corporate cash holdings (cash). The presence of corporate social 
responsibility (csr) in equation (1) allows for the possibility that csr may have a direct effect 
on corporate cash holdings. Equations (2) to (4) describe how csr affects the idiosyncratic 
risk channel (Equation (2)), the unsystematic risk channel (Equation (3)), and the corporate 
governance channel (Equation (4)), respectively. In this model, idiosyncratic risk, systematic 
risk, and corporate governance are the channels through which csr affects cash holdings 

















As for estimation, we first use the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method for the empirical 
model (i.e., Equations (1) to (4)) as a simultaneous equations model. One of the advantages 
of the ML method is that correlations between the error terms across equations are allowed 
for.  As a robustness check, we also use the Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation 
method to control for endogeneity. Furthermore, we re-estimate the empirical model with 
alternative definitions of cash holdings and risks to check whether the results are sensitive to 
the presence of these data or measurement issues. 
The total effect of csr on cash holdings can be decomposed into direct and indirect 
effects. The direct effect is   , while the indirect effects are      from the idiosyncratic risk 
channel,      from the systematic risk channel, and      from the corporate governance 
channel, respectively. To test for the indirect effect of, for example, the idiosyncratic risk 
channel, the null hypothesis may be set as follows: 
 
Ho:       .        (5) 
 
Note that an indirect effect (for example,      from the idiosyncratic risk channel) is 
determined by how csr may affect a particular channel (  ) and how this channel affects cash 
holdings       jointly. This also means that it is possible to see that both    and   , when 
tested independently, are statistically significant (insignificant) but are statistically 
insignificant (significant) when tested jointly.  
To test for the statistical significance of the joint effect (or indirect effect), we first 
estimate the indirect effect by multiplying the regression coefficients on key variables (i.e., 
idio, beta, cg, and csr) between the cash holdings equation and a particular channel equation. 
















idiosyncratic risk channel. The relevant coefficients are the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk 
from equation (1) (i.e., 1) and the coefficient of csr from equation (2) (i.e., 1). The indirect 
effect is just the product of these coefficients, namely, 11. Since these regression 
coefficients are themselves random variables, we need to estimate the standard error of the 
indirect effect. In principle, Goodman (1960) shows that with the normality assumption in the 
error terms, the standard error of the indirect effect can be computed exactly as follows: 
  












1)11(  sssss     (6) 
 
However, simulation studies show that the multivariate delta method proposed by Sobel 
(1982, 1986) provides the least unbiased estimates (MacKinnon, Warsi, and Dwyer, 1995; 
MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West and Sheets, 2002). The multivariate delta method 
approximates the standard errors of transformations of random variables (i.e., 1 and 1) 
using a first-order Taylor approximation. If the sample is large, the test statistic will converge 
to a normal variable and standard statistical inference can be applied.  Note that the delta 
method may not work well in cases in which the normality assumption is questionable, 
because the distribution of the product of two random variables (i.e., 1 and 1) is not 
necessarily normal even though these two random variables are normally distributed. To 
circumvent this issue, we use the bootstrapping method proposed by MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
and Williams (2004). In particular, we resample the N units with replacement from the 
original sample of N units. For each resample, we estimate the indirect effect in the 
resampled data. If we repeat the process k times and sort the values of indirect effect 
estimates from low to high, then we can find the upper and lower bounds of a 100(1-) per 
















In our case, we set k = 1000. In practice, the distribution of the indirect effect is typically 
skewed; this confidence interval can be further improved through bias correction, as shown 
by MacKinnon et al. (2004). One can reject the null hypothesis if zero does not lie within this 
bias-corrected confidence interval.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Summary statistics results  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the key variables. The table shows that the 
average value of corporate cash holdings (cash) is 14% of the total assets. The sample firms 
show an average CSR score of 0.01, while their scores on idiosyncratic risk (idio), systematic 
risk (beta), and corporate governance (cg) are 2.05%, 1.14, and -0.13, respectively. In other 
words, the average CSR firm is a firm without an impressive performance on CSR or 
corporate governance. Consistent with the findings of Campbell et al. (2001) that individual 
stocks have become increasingly volatile, they tend to have a relatively high portion of 
idiosyncratic risk (i.e., 0.0205/0.026 = 78.84%). They also tend to have high systematic risk 
(i.e., greater than one), meaning that they are also generally riskier than the stock market. The 
average firm may also be characterized as a large firm (fsize = 7.68) with some cash-flow-
generating ability (cfa = 4%), not much leverage (lev = 0.18), and some willingness to spend 
money on investment (capxa = 5%) and research and development (rnds = 3%). It is more 
likely to be a dividend payer (payer = 60%); when it pays dividends, the amount is small 
(dvpa = 0.00%). Consistent with the low dividend payout, the retained earnings are quite high 
(reta = 19%).  
 

















Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the variables. First, we find that the level of 
corporate cash holdings (cash) is positively and significantly correlated with CSR (0.09), 
suggesting that CSR firms are likely to hold more cash. Note that this finding is in contrast 
with A&P (2015) that report a negative correlation of  -0.04.9   This also provides a 
preliminary support to Hypotheses 2b and 3a, which predict a positive correlation between 
CSR and cash holdings. Second, consistent with the precautionary cash holding motive, cash 
holdings are correlated with idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk positively. Interestingly, 
their correlation with idiosyncratic risk happens to be the same as that with systematic risk 
(i.e., 0.21). Third, cash holdings are not correlated with corporate governance (-0.01), lending 
little support to the agency cost motive that firms with poor corporate governance (and thus a 
high agency cost) tend to hold more cash. The level of cash holdings is also positively 
correlated with the firm’s market-to-book ratio (0.15), R&D to sales (0.56), cash flow to 
assets (0.09), and cash flow volatility (0.62), while it is negatively correlated with the firm 
size (-0.36), capital expenditure (-0.14), net working capital to assets (-0.11), leverage ratio (-
0.43), magnitude of dividend payments (-0.14), whether the firm pays dividends (-0.36),  
retained earnings to total assets (-0.10) and whether the firm’s business is diversified (-0.20). 
This result is consistent with the view that firms with higher cash holdings tend to be those 
smaller and younger non-dividend-paying firms with lower leverage, working capital and 
business diversification but with higher growth opportunities, innovations, earnings, and 
business risk. 
  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.2. Main results 
                                                             
9
 Our sample is much larger in size and covers a longer time period, making our analysis results not amenable to 
possible criticisms on sample representativeness and short time span issues, which might plague the A&P 
















Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 present the estimation results of our simultaneous equations 
on the relationship between cash holdings and CSR. The estimation is performed by the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method on Equations (1) to (4) as a simultaneous equations 
system. We include a set of control variables that is similar to that of Opler et al. (1999) in 
our regression model. They include the firm size (size), market-to-book ratio (mtb), leverage 
ratio (lev), capital expenditure to total assets (capxa), dividends to total assets (dvpa), 
research and development to sales (rnds), net working capital to assets (nwca), cash flow to 
assets (cfa), cash flow volatility (cfav), and retained earnings to total assets (reta), as well as a 
dummy variable capturing whether a firm pays dividends or not (payer).10 To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, we also use a set of dummy variables capturing industry effect at 
two-digit SIC level and year effects.11  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Before getting into the details, we note that the results for the control variables are 
generally consistent with the prior literature. For example, we find that cash holdings are 
positively related to the market-to-book ratio (mtb), cash flow volatility (cfav), and R&D to 
sales (rnds), while they are negatively related to the leverage ratio (lev), retained earnings to 
total assets (reta), and whether or not the firm pays dividends (payer) (Opler et al., 1999; 
Dittmar et al., 2003; Bates et al., 2009; Dittmar and Duchin, 2011). Idiosyncratic risk is 
positively related to the cash flow to volatility (cfav), leverage ratio (lev), capital expenditure 
(capxa), R&D expenditure (rnds) and dividend payout (dvpa) but negatively related to the 
cash flow to assets (cfa), market-to-book ratio (mtb), firm size (fsize), retained earnings to 
                                                             
10 Interestingly, a similar set of variables has been used to explain idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk (see 
Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Jo and Na, 2012).  
11
 We do not specify fixed effects at firm level for two reasons. First, the ML estimation is inconsistent because 
of the incidental parameter problem. Second, panel fixed effect estimation methods may result in a substantial 
















total assets (reta) and diversification (diver) (Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Luo and Bhattacharya, 
2009).  
The results reported in column (1) show that corporate cash holdings are related 
positively (and statistically significantly) to idiosyncratic risk while they are related 
negatively (and statistically significantly) to systematic risk, confirming the results of Bates 
et al. (2009) and Acharya et al. (2013). Despite both the Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
Chen et al. (2012) papers having reported a negative association between corporate 
governance and cash holdings, we cannot find any statistically significant relationship 
between them. This inconsistency might be explained by the fact that the KLD measure of 
corporate governance focuses more on the transparency issue.12 The coefficient of csr is 
negative as well as statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that there may be a 
direct effect of CSR on cash holdings.13 Consistent with Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) and 
Albuquerque et al. (2014), Columns (2) to (3) reveal that csr is negatively related to 
idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk, even though its coefficient in the idiosyncratic risk 
equation is not statistically significant. Similar to Jo and Harjoto (2012), Column (4) shows 
that csr is positively and statistically significantly associated with corporate governance. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of hypothesis testing on the indirect effects of the 
three channels based on the delta method. Column (1) of Panel B shows that the indirect 
effect of csr is -0.006 (via idio), 0.158 (via beta), and -0.226 (via cg), respectively. Only the 
indirect effect of the systematic risk channel is statistically significant at the 5% level while 
the other two channels are not, providing a strong support to Hypothesis 2b.  
 
5.3. Robustness tests 
                                                             
12
 However, as shown in the Robustness tests section, we use institutional ownership (insown), an alternative 
measure of corporate governance, and still get similar results. 
13  As discussed later, this apparently significant result disappears once we estimate the same model after 
















Several tests are performed to check the robustness of our findings. In particular, we 
employ a different econometric technique that accounts for endogeneity and alternative 
specifications of cash holdings, csr, risks, and corporate governance.  
 
5.3.1. Accounting for endogeneity  
One may argue that csr is likely to be endogenous. For example, according to the agency 
theory, agency costs, which are not directly observable, may drive both cash holdings and csr 
to move together, even though we have controlled for some firm characteristics that can 
mimic the scope of managerial discretion (i.e., the severity of agency costs) in a firm.14 In 
other words, some unobserved variables that are omitted from the model but drive csr, are 
correlated with the error terms in the cash holdings equation (i.e., equation (1)). To deal with 
the endogeneity issue, we use the instrumental variable estimation (two-stage least squares) 
method to estimate the empirical model. Following Deng, Kang and Low (2013) and Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky (2014), we use an instrument called red state (redstate) for csr. The 
instrument refers to a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s headquarters is located in a 
red (Republican) state and zero otherwise. The information about whether a state is a red 
(Republican) or blue (Democratic) state is available at the US Electoral College 
(http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/historical.html). We use this 
instrument because it is found to be correlated with csr (Deng et al., 2013; Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky, 2014) and is unlikely to have a significant effect on the firm’s cash holdings. Di 
Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) argue that “political affiliation is a natural measure of 
preferences for social responsibility. The Democratic Party platform places more emphasis on 
CSR-related issues such as environmental protection, anti-discrimination laws and 
affirmative action, employee protection, and helping the poor and disadvantaged” (p.159) and 
                                                             
14
 The variance-covariance matrix of residuals as reported in Table 3 reveals that residuals are highly correlated 
among equations, suggesting that even after controlling for industry and year fixed effects there are still some 
















report evidence that csr scores are associated with the political affiliation of external 
stakeholders of firms (measured by voting patterns in the state where the firm is 
headquartered). In particular, Democratic-leaning firms are more socially responsible than 
Republican-leaning firms in the sense that they spend more on CSR. 
To construct the instrument, we first extract data on a firm's headquarters address from its 
annual reports (i.e., 10-K and related reports) on SEC’s Edgar website and find out the state 
in which the firm's headquarters is/was located.15 We then match the state with the list of blue 
or red states developed from the electoral results available at the US Electoral College's 
website to identify whether that state is a blue or red state in a particular year.    
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the 2SLS estimation results in Columns (1) to (4). As far as the 
weak instrument issue is concerned, we cannot find any evidence of a weak instrument 
because the F-statistic of the coefficient of the instrument “redstate” from the first stage 
regression is 43.96 (i.e., far greater than ten).  
After controlling for endogeneity, Columns (2) to (4) of Panel A indicate that csr can 
explain all of the three channels while Column (1) suggests that only systematic risk can 
explain cash holdings. Column (1) also shows that corporate cash holdings are least sensitive 
to changes in idiosyncratic risk because a unit increase in idiosyncratic risk will give rise to a 
29.0% increase in corporate cash holdings. However, a similar increase in systematic risk 
(corporate governance) leads to a 73.0% (39.3%) decrease (increase) in corporate cash 
holdings. Note that now there is no direct effect of csr on corporate cash holdings as the 
coefficient of csr is 0.186 and statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Consistent 
                                                             

















with Hypotheses 2b, Columns (2) and (4) reveal that firms with high csr scores tend to be less 
risky in the sense that they tend to have lower systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk; a 0.01 
unit increase in the csr score is associated with a 4.087% (11.884%) reduction in systematic 
(idiosyncratic) risk. 16  However, the same increase in csr score leads to only a 0.977% 
increase in corporate governance.  
Once we control for endogeneity, Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4 reveal a result similar to 
that of the ML estimation. The only differences are that idiosyncratic risk and csr lose their 
statistical significance in explaining cash holdings (see Column (1)) and that csr can now also 
explain idiosyncratic risk as well (see Column (2)).  
The bootstrapped confidence sets of the indirect effect test also confirm similar results 
(see Columns (1) to (4) in Panel B). The bootstrap results indicate that the indirect effect of 
the systematic risk channel is still statistically significant at the 5% level, regardless of 
whether or not we control for endogeneity. The other two channels are not statistically 
significant. 
  
5.3.2. Alternative definition of cash holdings  
We use, as an alternative definition of firm cash holdings, the ratio of the firm’s cash and 
cash equivalents divided by its book value of net assets (i.e., CHE/(AT - CHE)) and regress 
the alternative measure on CSR. Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003), and Bates et al. 
(2009) have used this alternative measure. The 2SLS regression results are shown in Columns 
(1) to (4) of Table 5.17 The results are similar to those obtained using the main definition. The 
only difference is that now we have a weak evidence showing that the idiosyncratic risk 
channel so matters. In particular, the 2SLS result shows that the coefficient of idiosyncratic 
                                                             
16 This kind of interpretation assumes that change in csr is small. However, by construction, the csr score must 
lie between 0 and 5. One unit change in csr (e.g., from zero to one) is admittedly too large.  
17 Only the 2SLS results are reported and discussed, because the 2SLS regression controls for endogeneity and 
















risk is now, significantly, at 10% (see Column (1) in Panel A) and the bootstrap result also 
confirms that the indirect effect of the idiosyncratic risk channel is negative (see Panel B). 
However, this does not affect our main findings that the systematic risk channel is statistically 
significant at the 5% level (see Panel B of Table 5).  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5.3.3. Alternative definition of csr 
 We also check for the robustness of our findings by using an alternative measure of csr 
called csrstr. This measure captures the strengths of CSR only, and may be interpreted as 
investment in CSR. The advantage of this alternative measure is that it can avoid an 
interpretation problem with net CSR scores. In particular, two firms with the same net CSR 
scores can be very different in terms of their scores on CSR strengths and CSR weaknesses, 
respectively. For example, Firm A (Firm B) may have a CSR strengths score of 5 (1) and a 
CSR weaknesses score of 5 (1), but these two firms share the same net CSR score (i.e., zero). 
We re-estimate the model by using CSR strengths only as an alternative measure of CSR. 
Table 6 shows that the regression coefficients of the three channels are of the same signs and 
similar magnitudes as in Table 3. Panel B of Table 6 reinforces the main finding that the 
indirect effect of the systematic risk channel is still statistically significant while the other 
channels are not.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
















We employ the Fama–French four-factor model to generate the residuals and use them to 
compute an alternative measure of idiosyncratic risk called idio1. This measure has been used 
by Cao et al. (2008), Ferreira and Laux (2007), and Luo and Bhattacharya (2009). The results 
are reported in Table 7. The results are essentially similar to but generally weaker than our 
main results reported in Table 3, because the coefficient of beta is now statistically significant 
at 10% only. However, the test on the indirect effects indicates that both the systematic risk 
channel and the idiosyncratic risk channel can explain cash holdings (see Panel B). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5.3.5. Alternative measure of systematic risk 
The main results may be sensitive to how the systematic risk is measured. The current 
beta measure uses the market model for estimation purposes. In particular, we compute the 
beta of year t from the market model by using daily stock market data from year t-1 to year t. 
We estimate an alternative measure of beta based on the Fama and French 4 factors model. 
We re-estimate and report the regression results in Table 8. Interestingly, our findings show 
that the coefficient of this alternative measure of beta is much larger. However, the main 
results remain largely intact. In particular, Panel B of Table 8 shows that only the systematic 
risk channel is always statistically significant at the 5% level while the other two channels are 
not. 
  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
















Recall that the KLD measure on corporate governance focuses more on the transparency 
issue. We replace the KDL’s corporate governance measure with the institutional ownership 
percentage (insown) and data for institutional ownership are taken from Thomson Reuters 
institutional data (formerly called Spectrum). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
Panel B of Table 9 shows that only the indirect effect of the systematic risk channel is 
consistently statistically significant at 5%. It is noteworthy that the idiosyncratic risk channel 
is also statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Taken together, we have clear evidence that CSR affects cash holdings indirectly. We also 
have strong evidence that the systematic risk channel is a major channel through which CSR 
can affect cash holdings. As the evidence on the significance of the idiosyncratic risk channel 
and the corporate governance channel is mixed, we cannot attain a definite answer regarding 





This study examines whether and how corporate social responsibility affects corporate 
cash holdings. In particular, it examines three channels through which corporate social 
responsibility affects cash holdings. The first channel argues that CSR-related activities can 
build up the social (or moral) capital of firms, because they enhance good relationships with 
stakeholders. Firms can use the social (or moral) capital to weather bad times and reduce the 
















customer loyalty and/or investor loyalty to CSR firms makes these firms less sensitive to 
aggregate market shocks (i.e., lowers the systematic risk), and this may increase or decrease 
the cash holdings. On the one hand, the need for cash hoarding may decrease because of 
lower systematic risk; on the other hand, the need may increase because firms with lower 
systematic risk tend to have a shorter debt maturity structure and, thus, a higher refinancing 
risk.  The third channel argues that CSR plays a corporate governance role and may increase 
or reduce the agency problems associated with corporate cash holdings.  
 
Using 2,364 firms with 14,206 firm-year observations over the period 1991–2011, we 
find that CSR is correlated with corporate cash holdings significantly and positively. We also 
find strong evidence that only one of the three channels is useful in linking CSR and 
corporate cash holdings, namely the systematic risk channel. The evidence on the 
idiosyncratic risk channel and the corporate governance channel is mixed and insufficiently 
robust. This implies that the systematic risk channel is a major channel through which CSR 
affects corporate cash holdings, while the other two channels are not.  
 
Our findings are robust to a variety of econometric approaches and alternative 
specifications of cash holdings, csr, risks and corporate governance. Thus, they provide 
strong support for the importance of corporate social responsibility in determining corporate 
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Appendix A: Key variables, sources, and definitions 
Variable Source Definition 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility (csr) KLD 
The average of net scores of KLD Measures on seven 
dimensions (community relations, corporate governance, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, 
and product safety). 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 1(csrstr) 
KLD The average of strength scores of KLD Measures on the 
seven dimensions. 
Cash to Assets (cash) Compustat Cash and Cash Equivalents/Book Assets 
Cash to Net Assets (cash1) Compustat Cash and Cash Equivalents/(Book Assets - Cash and Cash Equivalents) 
Idiosyncratic Risk (idio) CRSP Residual variance of the market model using daily stock returns of the previous twelve months. 
Idiosyncratic Risk 1 (idio1) CRSP Residual variance of the Fama-French 4 Factors Model using daily stock returns of the previous twelve months. 
Systematic Risk (beta) CRSP Beta coefficient of the market model using daily stock returns of previous twelve months. 
Systematic Risk 1(beta1) CRSP 
Beta coefficient of the market risk premium of the Fama-
French 4 factors model using daily stock returns of 
previous twelve months. 
Corporate Governance (cg) KLD Net Score for the Corporate Governance Dimension of the KLD Measures. 
Corporate Governance1 
(insown) Thomson Reuters  Percentage of institutional ownership. 
Cash Flow to Assets (cfa) Compustat (Income before Extraordinary Items - Common Dividends)/Book Assets 
Cash Flow Volatility (cfav) Compustat Standard deviation of Cash Flow to Assets (cfa) for the previous ten years. 
Market-to-book Ratio (mtb) Compustat (Stock Price * Shares Outstanding + Book Assets - Book Equity) / Book Assets 
Firm Size (fsize) Compustat Natural logarithm of Book Assets 
Leverage Ratio (lev) Compustat (Long-Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities)/Book Assets 
Capital Expenditure to 
Assets (capxa) Compustat Capital Expenditures/Book Assets 
Net Working Capital to 
Assets (nwc) Compustat 
(Working Capital - Cash and Short-Term 
Investments)/Book Assets 
Dividend to Assets (dvpa) Compustat Dividends/Book Assets 
Repurchase to Assets (repa) Compustat Share Repurchases/Book Assets 
















Payer (payer) Compustat Dummy variable equals one if dividend-paying and zero if otherwise 
Retained Earnings to Total 
Equity (reta) Compustat Retained Earnings/Total Equity 
Diversification (diver) Compustat Dummy variable equals one if the number of business segments > 1 and zero if otherwise 
Sales Growth Rate (sgr) Compustat Annual percentage change of Sales 
Red State (redstate) 
SEC’s Edgar + 
the US Electoral 
College 
Dummy variable equals one if a firm’s headquarters is 
located in a red (republican) state and zero if otherwise. 
The list of blue or red states is based on the electoral results 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics of the Key Variables 
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables for the period 1991 to 2011. cash is 
defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by assets. csr and cg are the aggregate corporate social 
responsibility score and the net score of the corporate governance dimension of KLD measures, 
respectively. idio and beta refer to idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk derived from the market model. 
fsize is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. mtb is the market value of assets divided by 
the book value of assets. lev is defined as the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. 
nwca is the working capital net of cash and cash equivalents divided by the book value of assets. cfa is 
defined as the operating cash flow divided by the book value of assets. cfav is the standard deviation of 
cfa for the previous ten years, requiring at least three observations. capxa is capital expenditure to total 
assets, while dvpa and repa refer to total dividends to total assets and share repurchases to total assets. 
rnds is defined as research and development expenses divided by sales revenue. payer and diver are 
dummy variables capturing whether or not the firm pays dividends and whether the firm’s number of 
business segments is greater than one. sgr is the sales growth rate. Our proxy for the firm life cycle is 





mean median std dev. skewness kurtosis 
cash 0.14 0.08 0.15 1.70 5.81 
csr 0.01 0.00 0.08 1.05 9.96 
beta 1.14 1.09 0.47 0.53 3.15 
idio 2.05 1.83 1.00 2.19 13.18 
cg -0.13 0.00 0.28 -0.28 4.23 
cfa 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.61 11.35 
stdcfa 0.06 0.04 0.06 1.81 7.97 
mtb 2.81 2.13 2.33 2.78 12.89 
fsize 7.68 7.58 1.53 0.30 2.59 
lev 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.88 3.43 
capexa 0.05 0.04 0.04 1.79 7.12 
nwca 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.15 3.18 
dvpa 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.73 41.74 
rnds 0.03 0.00 0.06 2.34 8.25 
payer 0.60 1.00 0.49 -0.42 1.18 
reta 0.19 0.24 0.93 -27.36 1004.88 
diver 0.70 1.00 0.46 -0.86 1.73 
sgr 0.12 0.08 0.59 69.36 6703.66 
















TABLE 2: Correlation Matrix of the Key Variables 
 
This table presents the Spearman correlation matrix between the variables used in the regressions. For the definition of the variables, see Appendix A. 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 cash 1.00 
                 
2 csr 0.09*** 1.00                 
3 beta 0.21*** -0.03*** 1.00 
               
4 idio 0.21*** -0.03*** 0.38*** 1.00 
              
5 cg -0.01 0.12*** 0.03*** -0.02* 1.00 
             
6 cfa 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.04*** -0.12*** -0.05*** 1.00 
            
7 stdcfa 0.62*** 0.06*** 0.18*** 0.25*** -0.01 0.08*** 1.00 
           
8 mtb 0.15*** 0.08*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.11*** 0.31*** 0.12*** 1.00 
          
9 fsize -0.36*** -0.01 -0.21*** -0.34*** -0.26*** -0.05*** -0.38*** -0.02** 1.00 
         
10 lev -0.43*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.23*** -0.35*** -0.04*** 0.26*** 1.00 
        
11 capexa -0.14*** -0.00 -0.01 0.04*** 0.02* 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.10*** -0.04*** 0.02 1.00 
       
12 nwca -0.11*** -0.00 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.14*** -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.31*** -0.10*** 0.01 1.00 
      
13 dvpa -0.14*** -0.00 -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.07*** 0.13*** 0.27*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 1.00 
     
14 rnds 0.56*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.10*** -0.00 0.44*** 0.16*** -0.18*** -0.28*** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.09*** 1.00 
    
15 payer -0.36*** -0.01 -0.26*** -0.36*** 0.03*** -0.09*** -0.39*** -0.01 0.37*** 0.12*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.11*** -0.32*** 1.00 
   
16 reta -0.10*** 0.01 -0.12*** -0.14*** 0.03** 0.19*** -0.14*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.08*** 0.06*** 0.10*** -0.04*** -0.14*** 0.15*** 1.00 
  
17 diver -0.20*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.16*** -0.08*** 0.26*** 0.09*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.04*** -0.14*** 0.19*** 0.00 1.00 
 
18 sgr 0.03** 0.01 0.04*** 0.02 0.02* 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.04*** -0.03** -0.01 0.04*** -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.04*** 1.00 
19 repa -0.14*** -0.00 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.00 -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.07*** 0.14*** 0.23*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.84*** -0.08*** 0.11*** -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.00 

















TABLE 3: Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation Results 
 
This table presents the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation results of our cash holdings model (i.e., 
equations (1) to (4)) in Columns (1) to (4). Panel A reports the estimation results for each of the four 
equations and Panel B shows the joint test results of the three channels where standard errors are 
estimated using the delta method. cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents to assets. idio is 
idiosyncratic risk and beta is systematic risk. cg is a corporate governance index based on KLD CSR 
measures. The control variables include the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its volatility (cfav), market to 
book ratio (mtb), firm size (fsize), working capital net of cash and cash equivalents to total assets 
(nwca), leverage (lev), capital expenditure to total assets (capxa), total dividends to total assets (dvpa), 
share repurchases to total assets (repa), retained earnings to total assets (reta), research and 
development expenses to sales revenue (rnds), diversification (diver), sales growth rate (sgr), and a 
dummy variable capturing whether the firm is a dividend-paying firm (payer). Robust standard errors 
are reported.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
     Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash idio beta cg 
     
constant 0.182 3.337*** 1.092*** 0.450*** 
 
(0.31) (0.17) (0.09) (0.03) 
idio 0.215***    
 
(0.05)    
beta -0.817*** 
   
 
(0.19) 
   cg 0.496 
   
 
(0.42) 
   csr -0.368* -0.026 -0.193*** 0.456*** 
 (0.20) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) 
cfa 0.203 -1.882*** -0.444*** -0.140*** 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.08) (0.04) 
cfav  0.773*** 2.079*** 0.418*** -0.175*** 
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.08) (0.05) 
mtb 0.018*** -0.024*** 0.008*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize 0.037 -0.209*** -0.027*** -0.062*** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
lev -0.187*** 0.869*** 0.187*** -0.010 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) 
capxa 0.146 1.056*** 0.795*** -0.156** 
 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.10) (0.06) 
nwca -0.087 -0.039 0.215*** 0.036 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02) 
dvpa -1.158 18.518** 0.868 0.220 
 
(4.09) (9.44) (5.19) (4.95) 
rnds 1.226*** 1.202*** 0.566*** -0.572*** 
 
(0.28) (0.16) (0.09) (0.05) 
reta -0.012 -0.079*** -0.032*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
payer -0.006*** 
   
 
(0.00) 
   diver  
 
-0.079*** 
   
 
(0.01) 

























    
(0.33) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Var-cov matrix   
    cash 0.105** 
   
 
(0.05) 




  beta 0.097*** 0.138*** 0.152*** 
 
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
 cg -0.031 -0.006*** -0.001 0.064*** 
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1-stage F statistic 
   
43.96 
No. of  Observations 14,206 14,206 14,206 14,206 
R² adjusted -3.384 0.491 0.303 0.193 
Panel B Delta Method 
 
 
Coefficient Std error    Z                       p-value 
Indirect (idio)       -0.006 0.015 -0.36 0.715 
Indirect (beta)        0.158 0.049 3.17 0.002 




















TABLE 4: Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Estimation Results 
 
This table presents the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation results of our cash holdings model 
(i.e., equations (1) to (4)) in Columns (1) to (4). The instrument for csr is redstate. Panel A reports the 
estimation results for each of the four equations and Panel B shows the joint test results of the three 
channels  where standard errors are estimated using the bootstrapping method with 1000 replications. 
cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents to assets. idio is idiosyncratic risk and beta is systematic 
risk. cg is a corporate governance index based on KLD CSR measures. The control variables include 
the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its volatility (cfav), market to book ratio (mtb), firm size (fsize), 
working capital net of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (nwca), leverage (lev), capital 
expenditure to total assets (capxa), total dividends to total assets (dvpa), share repurchases to total 
assets (repa), retained earnings to total assets (reta), research and development expenses to sales 
revenue (rnds), diversification (diver), sales growth rate (sgr), and a dummy variable capturing whether 
the firm is a dividend-paying firm (payer).  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
     Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash idio beta cg 
          
constant 0.239 3.631*** 1.200*** 0.441*** 
 
(0.35) (0.68) (0.29) (0.15) 
idio 0.290 
   
 
(0.18) 
   beta -0.730** 
   
 
(0.35) 
   cg -0.393 
   
 
(0.52) 
   csr 0.186 -11.884*** -4.087*** 0.977** 
 (0.82) (2.27) (0.91) (0.48) 
cfa 0.283 -1.181*** -0.223** -0.160*** 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.10) (0.05) 
cfav  0.470* 1.972*** 0.349*** -0.189*** 
 
(0.28) (0.23) (0.10) (0.05) 
mtb 0.013*** -0.006 0.014*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize -0.005 -0.188*** -0.022*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
lev -0.262*** 0.724*** 0.127*** 0.004 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) 
capxa -0.148 2.035*** 1.110*** -0.203*** 
 
(0.23) (0.35) (0.15) (0.08) 
nwca -0.067 -0.215* 0.158*** 0.053** 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) 
dvpa -4.014 38.625** 9.119 2.337 
 
(5.63) (15.20) (6.37) (5.28) 
rnds 0.657** 3.065*** 1.199*** -0.641*** 
 
(0.29) (0.43) (0.18) (0.09) 
reta 0.000 -0.066*** -0.027*** 0.006** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
payer 0.044 
   
 
(0.07) 
   diver  
 
-0.112*** 
   
 
(0.02) 
























   
-0.721* 
    
(0.39) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     1-stage F statistic 
   
  43.96 
No. of  Observations 13,657 13,657 13,657 13,657 
R² adjusted -2.695 -0.232 -0.083   0.178 







 95% confidence interval   
Indirect (idio) -3.448 39.89 -109.970  -0.270 
Indirect (beta)   2.982 32.31      0.617 23.102 




















TABLE 5: 2SLS Results for Alternative Cash holdings Measure (cash1) 
 
This table presents the 2SLS results of our cash holdings model (i.e., equations (1) to (4)) where we use 
an alternative measure of cash called cash1. The instrument for csr is redstate. Panel A reports the 
estimation results for each of the four equations. Panel B shows the joint test results of the three 
channels where standard errors are estimated by the bootstrapping method with 1000 replications. 
cash1 is defined as cash and cash equivalents to net assets. idio is idiosyncratic risk and beta is 
systematic risk. cg is a corporate governance index based on KLD CSR measures. The control variables 
include the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its volatility (cfav), market to book ratio (mtb), firm size 
(fsize), working capital net of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (nwca), leverage (lev), capital 
expenditure to total assets (capxa), total dividends to total assets (dvpa), share repurchases to total 
assets (repa), retained earnings to total assets (reta), research and development expenses to sales 
revenue (rnds), diversification (diver), sales growth rate (sgr), and a dummy variable capturing whether 
the firm is a dividend-paying firm (payer). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
     Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash1 idio beta cg 
          
constant 0.209 3.631*** 1.200*** 0.441*** 
 
(0.93) (0.68) (0.29) (0.15) 
idio 0.852* 
   
 
(0.48) 
   beta -1.917** 
   
 
(0.95) 
   cg -0.993 
   
 
(1.38) 
   csr 1.130 -11.884*** -4.087*** 0.977** 
 
(2.21) (2.27) (0.91) (0.48) 
cfa 0.838 -1.181*** -0.223** -0.160*** 
 
(0.65) (0.24) (0.10) (0.05) 
cfav  0.473 1.972*** 0.349*** -0.189*** 
 
(0.76) (0.23) (0.10) (0.05) 
mtb 0.031** -0.006 0.014*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize 0.008 -0.188*** -0.022*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
lev -0.604*** 0.724*** 0.127*** 0.004 
 (0.23) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) 
capxa -0.444 2.035*** 1.110*** -0.203*** 
 
(0.62) (0.35) (0.15) (0.08) 
nwca -0.061 -0.215* 0.158*** 0.053** 
 
(0.26) (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) 
dvpa -11.028 38.625** 9.119 2.337 
 
(15.07) (15.20) (6.37) (5.28) 
rnds 1.513* 3.065*** 1.199*** -0.641*** 
 
(0.78) (0.43) (0.18) (0.09) 
reta 0.002 -0.066*** -0.027*** 0.006** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
payer 0.168 
   
 
(0.19) 
   diver  
 
-0.112*** 
   
 
(0.02) 
























   
-0.721* 
    
(0.39) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
1st stage F- statistic      43.96 
No. of Observations 13,657 13,657 13,657  13,657 
R² adjusted -4.299 -0.232 -0.083   0.178 







 95% confidence interval   
Indirect (idio) -10.121 242.147 -109.593 -1.339 
Indirect (beta)    7.837 192.488      1.006 45.414 

















TABLE 6: 2SLS Results for Alternative CSR Measure (csrstr) 
 
This table presents the 2SLS results of our cash holdings model (i.e., equations (1) to (4)) where we use 
an alternative measure of CSR called csrstr. This measure is computed using the strengths of KLD 
scores only. The instrument for csrstr is redstate. Panel A reports the estimation results for each of the 
four equations. Panel B shows the joint test results of the three channels where standard errors are 
estimated by the bootstrapping method with 1000 replications. cash is defined as cash and cash 
equivalents to assets. idio is idiosyncratic risk and beta is systematic risk. cg is a corporate governance 
index based on KLD CSR measures. The control variables include the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its 
volatility (cfav), market to book ratio (mtb), firm size (fsize), working capital net of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets (nwca), leverage (lev), capital expenditure to total assets (capxa), total 
dividends to total assets (dvpa), share repurchases to total assets (repa), retained earnings to total assets 
(reta), research and development expenses to sales revenue (rnds), diversification (diver), sales growth 
rate (sgr), and a dummy variable capturing whether the firm is a dividend-paying firm (payer). *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash idio beta cg 
          
constant 0.440* 0.147 0.042 0.808*** 
 
(0.26) (0.56) (0.19) (0.07) 
idio 0.257 
   
 
(0.19) 
   beta -0.697** 
   
 
(0.28) 
   cg -0.360 
   
 
(0.55) 
   csrstr 0.761 -21.922*** -6.910*** 1.992*** 
 
(1.02) (2.69) (0.93) (0.36) 
cfa 0.249 -1.771*** -0.416*** -0.105** 
 
(0.31) (0.33) (0.11) (0.04) 
cfav  0.519 1.913*** 0.340** -0.179*** 
 
(0.32) (0.38) (0.13) (0.05) 
mtb 0.011*** 0.017* 0.020*** -0.010*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize -0.026 0.346*** 0.147*** -0.113*** 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) 
lev -0.216*** 0.022 -0.083 0.069*** 
 (0.08) (0.17) (0.06) (0.02) 
capxa -0.199 1.854*** 0.972*** -0.206*** 
 
(0.22) (0.51) (0.18) (0.07) 
nwca -0.073 -0.275 0.141** 0.061** 
 
(0.09) (0.18) (0.06) (0.02) 
dvpa -3.909 -32.638 -16.292* 4.903 
 
(5.20) (25.22) (8.68) (5.32) 
rnds 0.589 4.044*** 1.446*** -0.740*** 
 
(0.39) (0.52) (0.18) (0.07) 
reta -0.001 -0.071*** -0.030*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
payer 0.020 
   
 
(0.08) 
   diver  
 
-0.078** 
   
 
(0.04) 
























   
-0.430 
    
(0.39) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
1st stage F- statistic              43.96 
No. of Observations 13,657 13,657 13,657 13,657 
R² adjusted -2.407 -2.435 -1.015   0.168 
Panel B Bootstrap Method 
 
 




95% confidence interval 
Indirect (idio) -5.632 44.270 -123.306   2.446 
Indirect (beta)   4.818 17.830      1.635 74.025 

















TABLE 7: 2SLS Results for Alternative Idiosyncratic Risk Measure (idio1) 
 
This table presents the 2SLS results of our cash holdings model (i.e., equations (1) to (4)) where we use 
an alternative measure of idiosyncratic risk called idio1. The instrument for csr is redstate. Panel A 
reports the estimation results for each of the four equations.  Panel B shows the joint test results of the 
three channels where standard errors are estimated by the bootstrapping method with 1000 replications. 
cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents to assets. Idio1 is idiosyncratic risk estimated by the Fama-
French 4-factor model and beta is systematic risk. cg is a corporate governance index based on KLD 
CSR measures. The control variables include the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its volatility (cfav), 
market to book ratio (mtb), firm size (fsize), working capital net of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets (nwca), leverage (lev), capital expenditure to total assets (capxa), total dividends to total assets 
(dvpa), share repurchases to total assets (repa), retained earnings to total assets (reta), research and 
development expenses to sales revenue (rnds), diversification (diver), sales growth rate (sgr), and a 
dummy variable capturing whether the firm is a dividend-paying firm (payer). *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
     Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash idio1 beta cg 
          
constant 0.268 3.493*** 1.200*** 0.441*** 
 
(1.03) (0.67) (0.29) (0.15) 
idio1 0.961 
   
 
(0.61) 
   beta -2.038* 
   
 
(1.12) 
   cg -1.358 
   
 
(1.75) 
   csr 1.212 -11.659*** -4.087*** 0.977** 
 
(2.46) (2.22) (0.91) (0.48) 
cfa 0.922 -1.131*** -0.223** -0.160*** 
 
(0.78) (0.23) (0.10) (0.05) 
cfav  0.235 2.017*** 0.349*** -0.189*** 
 
(0.99) (0.23) (0.10) (0.05) 
mtb 0.030** -0.006 0.014*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize -0.008 -0.179*** -0.022*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
lev -0.643** 0.709*** 0.127*** 0.004 
 (0.28) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02) 
capxa -0.473 1.984*** 1.110*** -0.203*** 
 
(0.69) (0.35) (0.15) (0.08) 
nwca -0.004 -0.227** 0.158*** 0.053** 
 
(0.32) (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) 
dvpa -13.959 38.373*** 9.119 2.337 
 
(18.10) (14.88) (6.37) (5.28) 
rnds 1.413 2.941*** 1.199*** -0.641*** 
 
(0.91) (0.42) (0.18) (0.09) 
reta 0.005 -0.064*** -0.027*** 0.006** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
payer 0.210 
   
 
(0.24) 
   diver  
 
-0.111*** 
   
 
(0.02) 
























   
-0.721* 
    
(0.39) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
1st stage F statistic 
   
  43.96 
No. of  Observations 13,657 13,657 13,657  13,657 
R² adjusted -5.603 -0.278 -0.083   0.178 
Panel B Bootstrap Method 
 
 




95% confidence interval 
Indirect (idio) -11.210 95.311 -695.181  -0.699 
Indirect (beta)   8.327 82.155     0.438 65.144 

















TABLE 8: 2SLS Results for Alternative Beta Measure (beta1) 
 
This table presents the 2SLS results of our cash holdings model (i.e., equations (1) to (4)) where we use an 
alternative measure of beta called beta1. This beta is estimated by the Fama-French 4-factor model based on 
previous 12 months. The instrument for csr is redstate. Panel A reports the estimation results for each of the four 
equations. Panel B shows the joint test results of the three channels where standard errors are estimated by the 
bootstrapping method with 1000 replications. cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents to net assets. idio is 
idiosyncratic risk. cg is a corporate governance index based on KLD CSR measures. The control variables 
include the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its volatility (cfav), market to book ratio (mtb), firm size (fsize), 
working capital net of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (nwca), leverage (lev), capital expenditure to 
total assets (capxa), total dividends to total assets (dvpa), share repurchases to total assets (repa), retained 
earnings to total assets (reta), research and development expenses to sales revenue (rnds), diversification (diver), 
sales growth rate (sgr), and a dummy variable capturing whether the firm is a dividend-paying firm (payer). *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
    Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash idio beta1 cg 
          
constant 0.814* 3.631*** 0.013*** 0.441*** 
 
(0.42) (0.68) (0.00) (0.15) 
idio 0.036 
   
 
(0.10) 
   beta1 -67.751** 
   
 
(27.83) 
   cg 0.324 
   
 
(0.31) 
   csr -0.088 -11.884*** -0.020*** 0.977** 
 
(0.75) (2.27) (0.01) (0.48) 
cfa -0.001 -1.181*** -0.001* -0.160*** 
 
(0.18) (0.24) (0.00) (0.05) 
cfav  0.864*** 1.972*** 0.001* -0.189*** 
 
(0.18) (0.23) (0.00) (0.05) 
mtb 0.001 -0.006 -0.000*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize 0.004 -0.188*** -0.000*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
lev -0.113* 0.724*** 0.001*** 0.004 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.00) (0.02) 
capxa -0.241 2.035*** 0.003*** -0.203*** 
 
(0.18) (0.35) (0.00) (0.08) 
nwca -0.201*** -0.215* 0.001* 0.053** 
 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.00) (0.02) 
dvpa -2.736 38.625** -0.025 2.337 
 
(4.60) (15.20) (0.05) (5.28) 
rnds 0.908*** 3.065*** 0.004*** -0.641*** 
 
(0.25) (0.43) (0.00) (0.09) 
reta -0.010 -0.066*** -0.000*** 0.006** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
payer -0.033 
   
 
(0.05) 
   diver 
 
-0.112*** 
   
 
(0.02) 

























    
(0.39) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
1st stage F statistic 
   
  43.96 
No. of  Observations 13,657 13,657 13,657  13,657 
R² adjusted -1.656 -0.232 0.006   0.178 







95% confidence interval 
Indirect (idio) -0.427 8.907  -9.491 1.981 
Indirect (beta1)  1.369 7.440   0.304 6.050 





























TABLE 9: 2SLS Results for Alternative Corporate Governance Measure (institutional 
ownership) 
 
This table presents the 2SLS results of our cash holdings model (i.e., equations (1) to (4)) where we use 
institutional ownership (insown) as an alternative measure of corporate governance. The instrument for csr is 
redstate. Panel A reports the estimation results for each of the four equations. Panel B shows the joint test results 
of the three channels where standard errors are estimated by the bootstrapping method with 1000 replications. 
cash is defined as cash and cash equivalents to net assets. idio is idiosyncratic risk and beta  is systematic risk. 
The control variables include the cash flow to total assets (cfa), its volatility (cfav), market to book ratio (mtb), 
firm size (fsize), working capital net of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (nwca), leverage (lev), capital 
expenditure to total assets (capxa), total dividends to total assets (dvpa), share repurchases to total assets (repa), 
retained earnings to total assets (reta), research and development expenses to sales revenue (rnds), 
diversification (diver), sales growth rate (sgr), and a dummy variable capturing whether the firm is a dividend-
paying firm (payer). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
     Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cash idio beta insown 
          
constant 0.255 3.798*** 1.251*** 0.338*** 
 
(0.38) (0.75) (0.30) (0.13) 
idio 0.145* 
   
 
(0.08) 
   beta -0.594** 
   
 
(0.27) 
   insown 0.500 
   
 
(0.81) 
   csr 0.203 -14.162*** -4.505*** -1.675*** 
 
(0.84) (2.62) (0.96) (0.41) 
cfa -0.203 -0.715** -0.158 0.624*** 
 
(0.43) (0.29) (0.11) (0.05) 
cfav  0.745*** 1.868*** 0.366*** 0.103** 
 
(0.12) (0.27) (0.11) (0.05) 
mtb 0.013** -0.006 0.015*** -0.002* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
fsize -0.014 -0.185*** -0.023*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
lev -0.258* 0.645*** 0.117*** 0.166*** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.04) (0.02) 
capxa -0.002 2.327*** 1.161*** 0.004 
 
(0.31) (0.42) (0.16) (0.07) 
nwca -0.112 -0.277** 0.140*** -0.059*** 
 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.02) 
dvpa -5.822 44.628** 6.323 2.268 
 
(6.63) (17.61) (6.90) (4.63) 
rnds 0.788*** 3.401*** 1.199*** 0.408*** 
 
(0.19) (0.48) (0.19) (0.08) 
reta -0.007 -0.085*** -0.030*** 0.005** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
payer 0.011 
   
 
(0.06) 
   diver  
 
-0.127*** 
   
 
(0.03) 

























    
(0.34) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
1st stage F statistic 
   
  43.96 
No. of  Observations 12,613 12,613 12,613 12,613 
R² adjusted -1.400 -0.569  -0.180  -0.043 







95% confidence interval 
Indirect (idio) -2.052 24.631  -54.571  -0.027 
Indirect (beta)  2.678 16.833     0.354 24.216 






















 We identify and examine 3 channels through which CSR affects cash holdings 
 They are the idio. risk, beta channel and corporate governance channels 
 Only the systematic risk (beta) channel is consistently supported by the data.  
 The result suggests that CSR affects cash holdings positively via the beta channel. 
